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Organizing now
O
n March 9, at least 5,000 protesters picketed outside 
the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Washington, D.C., where 
America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the power-
ful industry trade association, was holding its annual 
lobbying conference. About 50 public figures—including writer 
Barbara Ehrenreich, Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) Secretary-Treasurer Anna Burger, AFL-CIO head Rich-
ard Trumka, the Center for Community Change’s Deepak 
Bhargava, and former Congressman Bob Edgar—participated 
in civil disobedience. The following day, 24 insurance- industry 
victims—people who lost family members, are suffering 
because they were denied care, or went bankrupt due to 
premium costs—confronted reform opponents on Capitol 
Hill, including House Minority Whip Eric Cantor. One of the 
protesters was Marcus Grimes, a 38-year-old former teacher 
who worked at a D.C. charter school that didn’t offer health 
insurance, and lacked the $3,000 down payment for doctor-
recommended surgeries that would have saved his sight. 
“The message we have is simple,” says Richard Kirsch, direc-
tor of Health Care for America Now (HCAN), a broad coali-
tion of more than a thousand labor, consumer, civil-rights, 
anti-poverty, community, netroots, and religious groups that 
sponsored the demonstration. “Congress should listen to us, 
not the insurance industry.”
The protest, which generated significant media coverage, 
was part of the endgame effort to salvage a victory from what 
appeared, following Scott Brown’s win in the Massachusetts 
Senate race only two months earlier, to be certain defeat. It 
represented an escalation in HCAN’s efforts to spotlight the 
destructive role of the insurance industry. 
The action coincided with President Barack Obama’s cross-
country speaking tour to energize voters to pressure Congress 
members to vote for reform—the kind of bold leadership activ-
ists had been waiting for.
“Let’s seize reform. It’s within our grasp,” Obama implored 
his audience at Arcadia University outside Philadelphia. He 
denounced the insurance companies, which “continue to ration 
care on the basis of who’s sick and who’s healthy.” Forgoing the 
bipartisan rhetoric that for months had frustrated activists, 
Obama taunted Republican critics who have stymied reform: 
“You had 10 years. What happened? What were you doing?” 
“I’m kind of fired up,” Obama continued, repeating a phrase 
he used in his campaign. Then he again appealed for help. “So 
I need you to knock on doors. Talk to your neighbors. Pick up 
the phone,” he said. 
The struggle to get health-care reform was a complex dance 
among progressive and corporate Democrats, House and Sen-
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Eighty-four percent said that they would be willing to share the 
responsibility of paying for a health-care program that covered 
all Californians. When asked to articulate the values that were 
most important to them in health-care reform, three emerged 
on top: keeping greed out of the health-care system (“Put people 
before profit”); affordability (“Quality of care shouldn’t depend 
on the money they have”); and wellness and prevention.
Surveys showed that participants overwhelmingly liked the 
event and would participate in similar ones (which is unlikely 
to be true of the crowded, nasty Democratic meetings). After 
the event, participants were more likely to trust state govern-
ment to do the right thing, to feel that they could understand 
state politics, and to contact their representatives in support 
of health reform. The California initiative was overtaken by 
the state’s budget crisis, but the forums helped build a diverse 
base of informed supporters.
Though it may be too late for national health care, the Obama 
administration could take a similar approach for reaching out 
to Americans, sponsoring public deliberations and listening to 
their priorities on controversial issues such as how to generate 
jobs, immigration reform, and environmental protection.
Some of Obama’s political and policy advisers will find social 
mobilization and public deliberation quite unattractive and 
even frightening. The president’s current advisers have thus far 
favored the insider game of congressional vote wrangling to the 
exclusion of strategies that draw upon powerful but less predict-
able currents in the American public at large. And many policy 
experts—in the White House or outside of it—recoil at the notion 
of putting complex issues such as health care, financial policy, 
and regulation to ordinary Americans, no matter how carefully 
constituted the group or well crafted the deliberation.
During his campaign, Obama often spoke in terms of a 
“we” and an “us” that fused the American public with himself. 
On the campaign trail, he said that “if you vote for me, then I 
promise you this: We will win the general election and then you 
and I together are going to change America and change this 
world.” But lately, President Obama has become less hopeful 
and more solitary and pugnacious even as his rhetoric sounds 
more populist. On financial reform, he told bankers and their 
lobbyists that if “these folks want a fight, it’s a fight I’m ready 
to have.” He promises to fight for us, rather than with us.
Some in the administration—thus far operating from the 
wings rather than on center stage—must reminisce about the 
heady days of the campaign, when millions of ordinary Ameri-
cans were “fired up, ready to go.” It took a stinging defeat in 
the New Hampshire primaries to allow these unconventional, 
small “d” democrats to move candidate Obama’s campaign 
from quite conventional strategies to the grass-roots mobi-
lization that later helped him win the presidency. A similar 
decentralized, trusting strategy will get this promising admin-
istration back on track. tap
Archon Fung, Ford Foundation Professor of Democracy and 
Citizenship, teaches about public participation, civic engage-
ment, and transparency at the Harvard Kennedy School.
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ate leaders, and several powerful industries—complicated by 
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel’s disastrous strategy of treating 
the insurance industry as a partner rather than a nemesis. 
In this battle, HCAN represented the progressive movement, 
sometimes working closely with the White House, other times 
mobilizing outside protest. 
Created in June 2008, HCAN raised more than $40 million 
from liberal foundations and unions—a small sum compared 
to the hundreds of millions spent by industry lobbies but 
enough to emerge as a serious player.
The largest actors in HCAN—USAction, SEIU, the American 
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, and 
MoveOn—are all, in political scientist Theda Skocpol’s terms, 
“federated” organizations. Each has the capacity to mobilize 
people at the local and state levels but also to coordinate strat-
egy at the national level. Most of the national leaders and staff 
of these organizations know each other from other campaigns 
and have experience as organizers of statewide and local affili-
ates. Because of the trust and experience of the core leadership 
team, HCAN was able to be flexible and strategic about targeting 
resources—staff and money—where they were needed at differ-
ent times. In states where unions were weak, for example, HCAN 
invested resources in community-organizing groups to put 
local pressure on elected officials. At different times during the 
campaign, HCAN had organizers in 42 states.
HCAN was one of several groups created 
to play similar inside-outside roles in the 
Obama era. American Rights at Work was 
formed to push for labor-law reform; Ameri-
cans for Financial Reform, to battle for stron-
ger bank regulations; Clean Energy Works, 
to mobilize support for environmental and energy legislation; 
Jobs for America Now, to focus public attention to win a pro-
gressive economic stimulus program; and Reform Immigration 
for America, to battle for immigration reform and immigrants’ 
rights. What lessons can we learn from these efforts?
InsIde strategy and OutsIde MObIlIzatIOn
In the 15 months since Obama’s inauguration, HCAN, a large 
and sometimes unwieldy coalition, was often uneasy about 
whether to be mainly a support group for the White House 
or a more assertive prod. But in the end it has played a very 
important role in rallying the base, smoking out the destructive 
role of the industry, and making it difficult politically for the 
administration to indulge its fantasies of a bipartisan deal.
In the battle for health-care reform, Obama made some 
serious strategic errors and disappointed his progressive sup-
porters. He began by making a grand bargain with the insur-
ance and drug industries. In exchange for more regulation 
they would get more customers at taxpayer expense. That deal 
made it difficult for the president to brand the industry as the 
prime obstacle to reform. The ingredients of the bargain—a 
mandate, taxation of some premiums, diversion of Medicare 
funds—made the bill an easier target for the right, and alien-
ated many moderate as well as liberal legislators.
In the summer and fall, the White House lost the momen-
tum and wasted precious months as it encouraged Sen. Max 
Baucus, a Democrat from Montana and chair of the Senate 
Finance Committee, to pursue a futile bipartisan deal. From 
the beginning, Obama sent mixed signals on whether he truly 
supported a strong public option. In the meantime, the Tea 
Party movement seized the mantle of popular unrest, demon-
izing the administration’s health-care proposal.
White House strategists, in regular contact with HCAN and 
other progressive groups, initially discouraged activists from 
mobilizing protests. Emanuel, in a now-famous incident dur-
ing a strategy session last August, excoriated several health-
reform groups (particularly Democracy for America and 
the Progressive Change Congress Campaign), calling them 
“retards” for running TV ads challenging centrist Democrats 
to choose between their loyalties to consumers and the deep-
pocketed insurance industry.
Reform activists sometimes disagreed on tactics. Some hoped 
to gain leverage by explicitly criticizing Obama. Others, particu-
larly the major unions, MoveOn, and consumer groups, believed 
that attacking the newly elected president, already under siege 
from the right, was counterproductive and wanted to focus pub-
lic ire on the insurance industry and its allies in Congress.
But this argument misses the point. The job of a social 
movement is to change the public debate so that progressive 
reforms become politically viable. Activism on the ground 
creates pressure for bolder reform and gives liberal elected 
officials more room to maneuver.
For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized 
that his ability to push New Deal legislation through Congress 
depended on the pressure generated by protesters—workers, 
World War I veterans, the jobless, the homeless, and farmers—
even though he didn’t always welcome it. The well-worn story 
that ends with FDR telling a group of activists, “I agree with you. 
Now, go out and make me do it,” has never been documented, 
but it is emblematic of the New Deal era. As protests escalated 
throughout the country, Roosevelt became more vocal, using 
his bully pulpit to criticize big business and to promote work-
ers’ rights. With his actions setting the tone, allies like Sen. 
Robert Wagner leading in Congress, and unions and other 
grass-roots groups mobilizing support on the ground, Roosevelt 
spearheaded legislation guaranteeing workers’ right to orga-
nize, the minimum wage, the 40-hour week, Social Security, 
public-works jobs, farm subsidies, and laws regulating banks. 
Reform required the synergy of activism in the country and 
leadership in the White House.
Likewise, the civil-rights movement and liberal politicians 
formed an awkward but effective alliance. In the early 1960s, 
Activism on the ground creates pressure 
for bolder reform and gives liberal 
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Organizing now
many Americans, including Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson, viewed the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. as 
a dangerous radical. He was harassed by the FBI and often vili-
fied in the media as an agitator. But the willingness of activists 
to put their bodies on the line against fists and fire hoses shifted 
public opinion. The movement’s civil disobedience, rallies, and 
voter-registration drives pricked the public’s conscience. The civ-
il-rights activism and the nation’s changing mood transformed 
Johnson from a reluctant advocate to a powerful ally. At the 
same time, King and other civil-rights leaders recognized that 
the movement needed elected officials to achieve legislation.
Similarly, the victories of the environmental movement start-
ing in the 1970s—such as the Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the decommission-
ing of nuclear power plants—required activists who knew that a 
combination of outside protest and inside lobbying, orchestrated 
by friendly elected officials, was needed to secure reform.
Savvy outsiders have always understood that legislation is 
typically a compromise. Whether those compromises co-opt a 
movement’s energies with token changes or become stepping-
stones toward more dramatic reform depends on the leader-
ship, depth, and persistence of grass-roots social movements.
“You need an outside strategy where you have a way to 
bang on Congress and the White House when it looks like 
they might start to sell you out,” observes Mike Lux, a former 
Clinton White House staffer who now consults for Democrats 
and progressive organizations. “Coalitions are by nature more 
cautious. There are always some players who don’t want to lose 
their access. That’s why it’s important for outsiders and insid-
ers to constantly be in contact, to develop trust, to acknowl-
edge their different roles.”
a MOveMent FInds Its FOOtIng
In Obama’s first year, an unholy alliance of the health-care-
industry lobby groups (insurance, pharmaceutical, hospital, 
and physicians’ groups), the conservative echo chamber (Fox 
News, The Wall Street Journal, Rush Limbaugh, and the right-
wing blogosphere), extreme conservative forces within the 
Republican Party, and their allies among Tea Party ultra-right 
groups, threatened to stymie reform, in large part by influenc-
ing moderate Democrats concerned about re-election and/or 
held hostage by medical-industry campaign contributions.
During the August congressional recess, an epidemic of 
right-wing anger against Obama and his policy agenda—of 
which health-care reform was simply an immediate and con-
venient target—captivated the media, which reported disrup-
tions at congressional town hall meetings as though they were 
an accurate reflection of public opinion rather than a pep rally 
for extremists, encouraged by Fox News and talk-show jocks. 
The right-wingers stoked fear and confusion by warning that 
Obama’s “socialized medicine” plan would create “death pan-
els,” subsidize illegal immigrants, pay for abortions, and force 
people to drop their current insurance.
Top Republicans including Sens. Charles Grassley of Iowa 
and Jim DeMint of South Carolina, and conservative broad-
casters Glenn Beck, Sean Hannity, Bill O’Reilly, Betsy McCa-
ughey, and Limbaugh repeated these myths. Support for the 
public option and for health reform in general tumbled over the 
summer. In June, 62 percent of Americans told Washington 
Post/ABC pollsters that they favored a public option. By mid-
August, support had slipped to 52 percent. Obama’s popularity 
fell, too, as jobs continued to disappear and the administration’s 
proposals to bail out the banks and the automobile industry met 
Democratic and Republican leaders met with Obama 
in a day-long meeting to discuss  health-care reform last February.
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with right-wing attacks and media skepticism. By the end of 
August, health-care reform appeared to be dead in the water. 
In its Aug. 17 cover story, BusinessWeek reported that “The 
Health Insurers Have Already Won.” All this pressure, in turn, 
reinforced White House and congressional temporizing.
In late August, seeing defeat on the horizon, HCAN and other 
reform activists regrouped. They decided to act more like a 
grass-roots movement and less like an interest group. That 
meant mobilizing voters, focusing attention on the insurance 
industry, humanizing the battle by giving insurance-company 
victims an opportunity to tell their stories, and using creative 
tactics to generate media attention.
Most Americans don’t like their insurance companies. But for 
months the Obama administration and Senate Democrats had 
coddled industry giants, hoping to 
enlist their support for reform. Glow-
ing media profiles of AHIP’s president 
Karen Ignagni admired her skill at 
coaxing the big insurance companies 
to try to co-opt, rather than confront, 
the Democrats, drawing a contrast 
to the industry’s combative stance 
during the early 1990s.
In September, October, and 
November, the grass-roots move-
ment focused on the insurance 
industry’s outrageous profits, abuse 
of consumers, and outsized political 
influence. And they publicly warned 
Democrats not to get duped by the 
industry’s pledges of cooperation.
The group mounted more than 
200 increasingly feisty protest events in 46 states. On Sept. 
22, for example, HCAN sponsored about 150 demonstrations 
at insurance-company offices across the country. The follow-
ing week, HCAN affiliates in Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and 
Indianapolis organized protest events at the homes of the CEOs 
of the three largest health-insurance corporations—CIGNA, 
United Health, and WellPoint. A week later, HCAN staked out 
the scenes of the crime—insurance-company headquarters 
in more than 50 cities—armed with signs, personal stories, 
crime-scene tape, and chalk to tell the CEOs, “It’s a crime to 
deny our care.” In some cities, protesters engaged in nonviolent 
civil disobedience and were arrested.
The ongoing protests highlighted HCAN’s flexibility in target-
ing and shifting resources where they could be most effective—
characteristics of “federated” organizations. HCAN was also 
adept at finding key allies who could help draw attention to 
their anti-industry campaign. HCAN not only highlighted the 
plight of victims but also identified former industry employees, 
like ex-CIGNA executive Wendell Potter and onetime Humana 
physician Linda Peeno, to blow the whistle on the industry’s 
abuse of its customers. Filmmaker Robert Greenwald’s company, 
Brave New Films, created several short videos documenting the 
outrageous compensation and lavish lifestyles industry CEOs 
enjoy (UnitedHealth’s Stephen Hemsley made $57,000 per day) 
while millions of Americans go without insurance or bankrupt 
themselves with medical bills. HCAN also forged links with 
groups outside their coalition, including PICO (the faith-based 
community-organizing network) and Health Care Now (a net-
work of single-payer activists). Starting in January, the Progres-
sive Change Campaign Committee, Democracy for America, 
and CREDO Action raised money from their e-mail networks, 
conducted polls in key Democratic congressional districts that 
found widespread support for the public option, got members 
to contact their representatives, helped recruit more than 120 
legislators to push to include the public option, and made sub-
stantial contributions to reward their strongest allies.
In his Sept. 9 speech to Congress about health reform, Obama 
began distancing himself from the 
industry. “As soon as I sign this bill, 
it will be against the law for insur-
ance companies to drop your cov-
erage when you get sick or water it 
down when you need it the most,” 
he declared.
Obama’s speech and HCAN’s bur-
geoning protest movement, embold-
ened Organizing for America, the 
group created to organize Obama’s 
former campaign volunteers. Some 
critics argued that Obama had put 
the OFA in a political straitjacket 
by folding it within the Democratic 
National Committee, making it dif-
ficult to confront conservative Dem-
ocrats. In September, a number of 
OFA staffers and key volunteer leaders threatened to quit if the 
OFA didn’t encourage its members to challenge Democrats who 
opposed Obama’s health-care plan. In response, the OFA urged 
members to participate in the protest rallies, and it began target-
ing moderate Democrats. On Oct. 20, local OFA groups generated 
315,023 calls to Congress pushing health-care overhaul.
In response to mounting criticism, the insurance industry 
miscalculated. After pretending to cooperate with the Obama 
administration and Democrats, the industry’s CEOs and lob-
byists double-crossed their onetime political allies by publicly 
attacking a compromise bill crafted by Sen. Baucus.
The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the Bau-
cus bill would cost $829 billion over 10 years—less than the 
$900 billion President Obama had suggested. The industry 
wasn’t happy with even the weak provisions in the proposal 
to “contain costs”—which translated as “reduce profits.” Nor 
did it like that the bill reduced penalties for those who failed 
to buy private insurance.
AHIP abruptly released a report attacking the bill, warning 
that family premiums would increase dramatically. The White 
House and the Democratic leadership in Congress were taken 
by surprise. Said Scott Mulhauser, a spokesperson for Baucus 
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Organizing now
report is untrue, disingenuous, and bought and paid for by 
the same health-insurance companies that have been gouging 
consumers for too long.”
Obama used his weekly address on Oct. 17 to blast the insur-
ance industry. “The history is clear: For decades rising health-
care costs have unleashed havoc on families, businesses, and 
the economy,” Obama said. “And for decades, whenever we 
have tried to reform the system, the insurance companies have 
done everything in their considerable power to stop us.” He 
charged the industry with “filling the airwaves with deceptive 
and dishonest ads” and “funding studies designed to mislead 
the American people.” 
Sen. Harry Reid and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi both 
expressed support for some version of a public option. On Oct. 
21, the House Judiciary Committee voted to strip the health-
 insurance industry of its 64-year-old anti-trust exemption, 
enabling the government to force more competition into the 
industry.
By the third week of October, a Washington Post/ABC poll 
found that 57 percent favored a public insurance option, while 
40 percent opposed it. Since then, polls have found that a sig-
nificant majority of Americans support the Democrats’ reform 
plans, including a public option, after it is explained to them.
What happened was a good example of the outside/inside 
strategy. Progressive health-care reform activists—primarily 
through the vehicle of HCAN—took the offensive and attacked 
the insurance industry more aggressively, pushing insurers 
into a miscalculation. That, in turn, emboldened the White 
House to treat the industry as a target rather than an ally.
In early February, there was one more industry miscalcula-
tion. WellPoint, the nation’s second largest insurance corpora-
tion, provided health-care reformers with what HCAN campaign 
coordinator Tom Swan called “the gift that keeps on giving.” 
Anthem Blue Cross, a WellPoint subsidiary, announced double-
digit rate hikes for its California customers. The increase, which 
will affect about 700,000 customers, averaged 25 percent, but 
some consumers will receive hikes as high as 39 percent.
Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius 
said it was “difficult to understand” how premium increases 
of that size could be justified when WellPoint reported a $2.7 
billion profit last quarter. Sen. Reid attacked “greedy insurance 
companies that care more about profits than people.”
The news media pounced on WellPoint, providing examples 
of families who would be victimized by the company’s huge rate 
hikes. The Obama administration and Democratic members of 
Congress used the hike as an example of why the nation needs 
long-delayed insurance reform. Democrats scheduled a Feb. 
24 hearing before the House Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee to investigate the rate hike and demanded that WellPoint’s 
$9.8 million-a-year CEO, Angela Braly, testify. Faced with the 
furor, Anthem announced that it would postpone the increase 
from March 1 until May 1. Incredibly, however, other compa-
nies followed WellPoint’s lead, announcing major rate hikes.
“If we don’t act, this is just a preview of coming attractions,” 
Obama said at a White House briefing. “Premiums will continue 
to rise for folks with insurance, millions more will lose their 
coverage altogether, our deficits will continue to grow larger.” 
Obama’s proposed bill, unveiled Feb. 22, even included national 
rate regulation of insurers. By the time of Obama’s Feb. 25 sum-
mit meeting, the politics were back where they belonged, with 
the president and consumers on one side and Republicans and 
the resented insurance industry on the other. With Republicans 
cornered, a bill to end the industry’s anti-trust exemption passed 
the full House by the lopsided margin of 406 to 19.
Why didn’t the insurance industry have the common sense to 
hold off rate increases until health-care reform was behind them? 
“Wall Street rules,” HCAN’s Kirsch explains. “The tyranny of quar-
terly profits will always come before any political calculation.”
lessOns learned
Building and strengthening a progressive movement requires 
an investment of money in human capital—in people and orga-
nizations that have the capacity to win victories that make a 
big difference in changing public policy and improving people’s 
lives. Progressive social change doesn’t just happen because 
“the time is ripe.” It happens because people and organiza-
tions ripen the time. They make strategic choices—mobilizing 
people, training leaders, picking issues, identifying politi-
cal opportunities, conducting research, 
recruiting allies, utilizing the media, and 
negotiating with opponents—that help 
win real victories. Building a movement 
means changing the political climate so 
that victories become stepping-stones to 
further and broader victories.
Many progressive Democrats who initially opposed a com-
promise bill without a public option, including former Demo-
cratic National Committee Chair Howard Dean, eventually 
changed their views.
“Many of us who believe in a strong public option or a single-
payer system have come to understand that those goals may not 
be feasible right now,” observed Rep. Jan Schakowsky of Illinois, 
a former community organizer. “This isn’t everything we wanted, 
but this is a first step we need in order to move forward. It will be 
the most comprehensive reform bill in our country’s history.”
Any movement or organization vying for power needs three 
things: First, it needs capacity. This means having leaders, staff, 
volunteer troops, and a system for developing and regenerating 
such a team. Second, it needs resources. This means money 
and access to research, policy expertise, and management 
support. Third, it needs visibility. This means having the abil-
ity to generate free media attention in various ways—through 
TV, radio, newspapers, and magazines as well as YouTube 
Social movements must press for victories 
in different issue areas that build on 
each other rather than compete for attention.
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W
e’ll begin with some good news. In mid-February, 
7,600 baggage handlers and ramp workers for 
Continental Airlines—painfully aware that they 
were the lowest-paid handlers in the industry and 
that their four previous attempts to unionize had all fallen 
short—finally voted to join a union. This was a more arduous 
achievement than it may sound. Under the byzantine provi-
sions of the Railway Labor Act, which governs labor relations 
in the airline industry as well, workers seeking a union need 
to win a majority not just of those employees who vote but of 
all the employees in their unit. Worse yet, their unit is defined 
as everyone in their job category within the United States: 
The more than 2,000 Continental ramp workers employed at 
the airline’s Houston hub, for instance, could not vote to join 
the union on their own.
In fact, says Jeff Farmer, the organizing director of the Team-
sters, the union that the ramp workers voted to join, “Continental 
has 47 stations across the country—and we were able to reach out 
to all of them.” That required a campaign on a scale that only half 
a dozen of America’s unions would be able to mount, and even 
by those standards, the Teamsters’ effort was extraordinary. “A 
number of other unions congratulated us,” Farmer adds. 
But the reason for the congratulations was sobering: The 
Teamsters’ victory was just about the only good news that 
American unions had experienced in the first year of Barack 
Obama’s presidency. 
In 2008, unions had worked tirelessly for Obama’s election 
in the hope that a Democratic president backed up by a heavily 
Democratic Congress could change the law that made organiz-
ing American workers so difficult. With the upset victory of 
Republican Scott Brown in the race for the vacant Senate seat 
from Massachusetts, however, those hopes were definitively dis-
pelled. The failure to reform labor law almost certainly means 
that that the half-century decline of unions in America—from 
representing nearly 40 percent of private-sector workers at the 
midpoint of the 20th century to representing just 7 percent 
today—will continue apace. It means that the corresponding 
stagnation—and periodic decline—in the incomes of working- 
and middle-class Americans will likely continue as well. 
But the failure of labor-law reform was hardly the only 
disaster that befell unions in 2009. Amid the greatest eco-
nomic downturn since the 1930s, many thousands of union-
ized manufacturing, construction, and public employees lost 
their jobs, sending the percentage of unionized workers to 
record lows. Public support for unions also plunged, with 
Why Can’t Labor Get  
a Little More Help From 
Its Friends?
By HarolD Meyerson
and Facebook. Visibility also means garnering the attention 
of policy-makers as well as key allies and the broader public.
We do not yet have a comprehensive, federated progressive 
movement with the capacity to be effective, flexible, and agile 
in forging coalitions, prioritizing issues, allocating staff, and 
winning victories in different issue areas that build on each 
other rather than compete with one another for the attention 
of the public and elected officials. This is what distinguishes 
“issue campaigns” from “social movements.” But the experience 
of HCAN suggests that we have a good beginning.
The administration’s protracted quest for bipartisanship 
long after Republicans had signaled that their goal was to 
destroy Obama’s reform plan and presidency was a mistake. 
So, too, was Obama’s long delay in detailing his plan, which 
allowed Baucus, a close insurance-industry ally, to take the 
initiative in crafting legislation. HCAN could have gone after 
the industry and waffling conservative Democrats earlier and 
even more aggressively. The health-reform campaign would 
have been more effective had the movement been stronger in 
a few key small and middle-sized states—especially Montana, 
North Dakota, Nebraska, Indiana, Delaware, and Louisiana—
where “moderate” Democrats, particularly in the Senate, exer-
cised disproportionate influence.
Obama has disappointed progressives on several fronts, 
including the Wall Street bailouts, the weak foreclosure pro-
gram, the too timid stimulus plan, and the expansion of the 
war in Afghanistan. But if we want Obama to be a more 
progressive president, we need more activism rallying public 
opinion on the ground, making it more difficult for the admin-
istration to take the progressive base for granted, pushing 
fence-sitting Democrats to vote for progressive bills or face 
primary opponents, and countering the power of big business 
and the religious and cultural right.
The battle over health-care reform wasn’t just about health 
care. For conservatives, it was about killing any hope for a 
progressive agenda. Last summer, Sen. DeMint said out loud 
what most Republicans in Congress, and their Fox News and 
Tea Party allies, were thinking and plotting. The health-care 
overhaul could be the president’s “Waterloo,” DeMint said. 
If the Republicans defeat health-care reform, it would write 
the conservative playbook for blocking other key components 
of the president’s and progressives’ agenda—including action 
on climate change, immigration reform, marriage equality, a 
second jolt of economic stimulus, pro-consumer bank reform, 
and updates to the nation’s labor laws.
The health-care battle taught progressives how to play the 
inside-outside game more effectively. They will need to draw on 
those lessons for upcoming battles. “For every issue that Con-
gress will be facing the rest of this year and beyond,” Kirsch says, 
“we need to force them to answer the same question: Which side 
are you on? The public good or corporate America?” tap
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